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Abstract
I estimate a price elasticity of sickness absence. Sick leave is an intensive margin
of labor supply where individuals are free to adjust. I exploit variation in tax rates
over two decades, which provide thousands of diﬀerential incentives across time and
space, to estimate the price responsiveness. High taxes provide an incentive to take
more sick leave, as less after tax income is lost when taxes are high. The panel data,
which is representative of the Swedish population, allow for extensive controls including
unobserved individual characteristics. I ﬁnd a substantial price elasticity of sick leave,
-0.7, with respect to the net of tax rate. Though large relative to traditional labor
supply elasticities, Swedes are half as price elastic as bike messengers, and just as
elastic as stadium vendors on the margin which they can adjust freely.
JEL codes: H31, I31, J22
Key words: sick leave, adjustable labor supply, work eﬀort, taxes
1 Introduction
The neoclassical model of labor supply predicts that employees work more when wages are
higher, but estimated labor supply elasticities on the intensive margin are small.1 This ﬁnding
could reﬂect that individual preferences are inelastic or that individuals face lumpy labor
∗Contact info: Martin.Ljunge@econ.ku.dk, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Øster
Farimagsgade 5, bygning 26, 1353 København K, Denmark. I’d like to thank James Heckman, Austan
Goolsbee, Bruce D. Meyer, Casey B. Mulligan, Alberto Alesina, Vincent Crawford, Andrea Ichino, Loukas
Karabarbounis, Juanjuan Meng, Gerald Oettinger, and Kelly Ragan for valuable discussions and suggestions.
I acknowledge support from the Riksbank Tercentiary Fund. This research has been approved by the Ethical
Review Board, protocol 2010/5:9.
1See for example Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) who reviews a large number of papers. Intensive margin
elasticities are usually estimated in a range from zero to 0.1.
1contracts.2 A more fundamental problem could be that preferences are reference-dependent
or that the model is misspeciﬁed in some other way. In this paper I estimate an elasticity of
labor supply along a margin where people are free to adjust and ﬁnd a sizeable labor supply
response that is consistent with the neoclassical model.
The analysis is part of a growing literature that studies workers with very ﬂexible labor
contracts. These workers are free to choose which days or hours they work. The stadium
vendors studied by Oettinger (1999) are free to choose which games they work, and they are
more likely to work high wage games like Sundays. The bike messengers studied by Fehr and
Goette (2007) are free to sign up for as many shifts as they like, and they work substantially
more shifts during a four week wage hike. These studies show that when workers are free to
choose they respond strongly to prices.
Yet, everyone who can choose how much to work doesn’t behave in the same way. Taxi
drivers in New York City, who can choose their hours freely, work less during high wage
days as studied by Camerer et al (1997). This negative wage elasticity is inconsistent with
the neoclassical model, as a few good fares don’t signal a permanent change in earnings
opportunities. Camerer et al (1997) suggest an alternative model; workers have a daily
income target below which they are very elastic and above which they are much less elastic.3
Crawford and Meng (2011) estimate a model with both income and hours targets, based on
the model of reference-dependent preferences by Köszegi and Rabin (2006). Crawford and
Meng (2011) ﬁnd that taxi drivers work less on days they earn more than average, which
supports Camerer et al’s (1997) negative wage elasticity. They also ﬁnd that cumulative
2See for example Kahn and Lang (1991) and Dickens and Lundberg (1993).
3Farber (2005, 2008) challenges this conclusion by arguing that the decision to stop work primarily is
related to cumulative hours of work to that point, and that income targets are too unstable to yield a useful
model of labor supply. Farber (2005, 2008) does not estimate a wage elasticity of labor supply.
2hours worked are important predictors for the stopping probability, which reconciles Farber’s
(2005) critique.
This literature pits neoclassical stadium vendors and bike messengers against behavioral
taxi drivers. Does either of these ﬁndings generalize to the population at large or do they
only reﬂect diﬀerences in the environments faced by bike messengers and taxi drivers?4 I
study a representative sample of 162,000 individuals that includes everyone from dentists to
day laborers, and I ﬁnd that they behave like stadium vendors.
I study sick leave in Sweden. Because sick leave is taken at the individual’s discretion I
can estimate how labor supply responds in a setting where employees are free to choose how
much to work. This is similar to the situation of bike messengers and cab drivers.
I use variation in marginal tax rates to identify the price responsiveness of sick leave.5
Tax law changes are arguably exogenous to individual sick leave decisions. Tax rates vary
across time, locations, and due to the progressivity of the tax code. This provides thousands
of diﬀerential treatments across time and space from which I can obtain the price response,
in contrast to the single wage hike for the bike messengers in Fehr and Goette (2007) and
the dozen Sunday home games in a baseball season in Oettinger (1999). Marginal tax rates
both increase and decrease repeatedly during the 17 year sample.6 This allows us to replace
the common linear trends assumption used in one shot policy evaluations with the weaker
assumption that omitted factors don’t follow the non-linear path of tax rates over time, paths
that also diﬀer substantially across individuals. I estimate the elasticity by comparing the
4Oettinger (1999) studies 127 vendors at one baseball stadium, and the taxi papers have data on 13 or 21
drivers in New York City. Fehr and Goette (2007) study 42 bike messengers in Zurich.
5Individuals forego some income if they claim sick leave beneﬁts rather than work. The forgone income
after tax is less when marginal taxes are high, hence sick leave is expected to be higher when marginal tax
rates are higher, ceteris paribus.
6See Figure 2 for an illustration of the average marginal tax rates over the sample period 1974-1990.
3number of days of sick leave within individuals and across years to the tax schedules faced
in those years.
Swedes are highly elastic when they are free to adjust. The elasticity of sick leave with
respect to the net of marginal tax rate is estimated to -0.7. Individuals work substantially
more during years when they face relatively low tax rates. While the estimate is large
relative to traditional labor supply elasticities, it’s half that of the bike messengers in Fehr
and Goette (2007), and similar to estimates in Oettinger (1999). When Swedes are free to
choose they behave as though they are neoclassical and their labor supply elasticity mirrors
that of stadium vendors. While the gain-loss utility parameters of Köszegi and Rabin (2006)
are important for understanding the behavior of New York City taxi drivers, these parameters
are not necessary for understanding the labor supply of the Swedish population.7
Beyond wages, the eﬀects of anticipated changes in the work environment on absenteeism
have been studied by Ichino and Riphahn (2005). After employment protection kicks in
absenteeism increases, which they interpret as an eﬀort response. Sick leave may also be
interpreted as an observable eﬀort choice. The sick leave program provides a very ﬂexible
way for individuals with low motivation to not exert eﬀort on the job.8 Fehr and Goette
(2007) ﬁnd a negative wage elasticity of eﬀort,9 which may look like the negative elasticity
found among taxi drivers. However, since wages are anticipated in their experiment it is not
clear this is evidence of income targeting based on a model like Köszegi and Rabin (2006)
7This is certainly not evidence against the existence of reference-dependent preferences. However, by
Occam’s razor, the neoclassical labor supply model provides a satisfactory explanation for the elasticity with
fewer free parameter assumptions.
8Absenteeism as a measure of eﬀort has been studied by Ichino and Maggi (2000) who examine how
absenteeism is inﬂuenced by regional background.
9The negative eﬀort elasticity is implied by the wage elasticity of shifts worked being larger than the
elasticity of revenue earned.
4where anticipated wage increases are predicted to increase eﬀort. The results, interpreted as
eﬀort, are consistent with both the neoclassical and the reference-dependent models as the
tax schedules are known when individuals make their sick leave choices.
The results may not be surprising from the perspective of Köszegi and Rabin (2006)
given that tax schedules are announced in advance and hence anticipated. The negative
wage responses estimated by Crawford and Meng (2011) are driven by unanticipated shocks.
The potential bias from ignoring reference-dependent preferences may not be important for
estimating the average responses to tax reforms and other pre-announced policy changes.10
When it comes to two decades of tax reforms, the evidence points to the neoclassical model
as a suﬃciently good explanation for the estimated elasticity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the sick leave
program in more detail, and section 3 presents the data. The following two sections discuss
the economic and empirical models. The empirical results are presented in section 6. Section
7 concludes.
2 The Sick Leave Program
Sweden has a publicly run sick leave insurance program that covers a fraction of lost earnings
in the case of basically any injury or illness.11 It is very easy to claim the beneﬁts. For the
ﬁrst week of each spell, the law gives the individual the discretion to determine if he is ﬁtt o
work or not. If he wants to claim the sick leave beneﬁts he makes two phone calls, one to the
10Unbiased estimates of the labor supply elasticity are important for assessing the welfare losses of taxa-
tion as well as for predicting labor supply responses to tax reforms and other policy measures. From this
perspective it’s also important to have estimates from a representative population.
11In a comparison to the U.S. the program encompasses both ’personal days’ provided in employment
contracts (although restricted to sick leave) and the workers’ compensation program.
5social insurance oﬃce and one to his employer.12 There is no ﬁxed allocation of sick leave
days, you can use the insurance as long as your sickness requires and for as many spells as
you like. For spells up to 7 days the individual himself determines if he is ﬁtt ow o r k .F o r
spells longer than 7 days it is required that a physician validates your condition. Monitoring
of actual sickness is very light, at least in part due to the diﬃculty in verifying conditions
like stomach ache and back pain.
The rules governing the sick leave insurance have been remarkably constant over the 1974-
1990 period.13 In 1974 sick leave beneﬁts became taxable income14 a n dd a t ao nt h eb e n e ﬁts
become available. The replacement rate for lost earnings due to sickness was set to 90%.
The daily beneﬁt is calculated as 90% of normal annual labor earnings divided by 365, up to
a cap. The replacement cap is indexed to inﬂation. About 93 percent of the incomes are
below the cap, and 6 percent of the sick leave observations are above the cap.
Beneﬁts can be claimed from the second day of the sickness spell. The deﬁnition of the
second day is, however, quite generous. It is suﬃcient to call in sick before midnight and
that day counts as the ﬁrst day of the spell. If you think you’ll be sick tomorrow you can
always call in sick today and the ﬁrst unpaid day is of no consequence, and if it turns out
that you’re ﬁt for work tomorrow you can change your mind.
If the sickness spell is shorter than 7 days there is no requirement that a physician validates
your condition. This system was in place until 1987.15 From 1988 through 1990 the ﬁrst day
of no coverage was abolished.16 The analysis can’t be extended further than 1990 since other
12Beneﬁts are paid by the social insurance oﬃce directly to the claimant.
13The sick leave program was passed into law in 1962 (SFS 1962:381) and it took eﬀect in 1963.
14The updates to the program are detailed in law SFS 1973:465.
15Year ﬁxed eﬀects are used to account for aggregate changes in the empirical analysis. Furthermore, the
results are robust to excluding 1988-1990 from the analysis.
16The updates to the program are detailed in law SFS 1987:223.
6reforms make the data from 1991 and on diﬃcult to compare to the previous years.17
Most sick leave spells are short, about 95 percent are shorter than one month (Source:
Försäkringskassan). You need to have earnings for six months in order to qualify for the
sick leave beneﬁts and be less than 65 years of age. The program is universal and it is
administered by the central government and does not depend on your employer. Beneﬁts
are ﬁnanced through a ﬂat payroll tax.
The study of sick leave has predecessors in the program participation literature,18 although
they focus on longer term absenteeism or programs where workers are not free to choose,
which do not ﬁt the concept of freely adjustable labor supply. Several papers have studied
how rule changes aﬀect beneﬁtu s e . 19 The Workers’ Compensation program, which replaces
earnings due to work related injuries, would be the most closely related program in the U.S.,
see Meyer, Viscusi, and Durbin (1995), Krueger (1990), and Curington (1994). The Swedish
sick leave program does not impose a limit on the length of spells, hence making it comparable
to disability insurance.20 21
Two novel contributions I make to the program participation literature are, ﬁrst, to use
tax rate variation, and second, to study a panel over a long time period to estimate the price
elasticity of program use. Using tax rate variation over a long time period complements
17Employers are mandated to pay the ﬁr s tt w ow e e k so fs i c kl e a v es ot h er e g i s t r yd a t ao n l yi n c l u d e ss p e l l s
of at least two weeks, which is a very diﬀerent margin of behavior from what is analyzed here.
18Social insurance programs that cover lost earnings due to health shocks exist in most developed nations,
see for example Bound and Burkhauser (1999) and Barmby, Ercolani and Tremble (2002).
19See Johansson and Palme (1996, 2002, 2005), Henrekson and Persson (2004), and Pettersson-Lidbom
and Skogman-Thoursie (2008) for evidence from Sweden, Dale-Olsen (2009) for evidence from Norway, and
Ziebarth and Karlsson (2010) and Puhani and Sonderhoﬀ (2010) for evidence from Germany. These papers
all provide interesting evidence but they do not capture a discretionary margin of freely adjustable labor
supply and the wealth of price variation used in this paper.
20Disability insurance behavior has been studied in the U.S. and elsewhere. Studies include Bound (1989),
Gruber (2000), Autor and Duggan (2003), Campolieti (2004), and Chen and van der Klaauw (2008).
21However, few individuals have long spells during the period studied. There is an early retirement program
individuals can enter if permanently injured.
7the existing literature that has focused on relatively short run evaluations before and after
reforms. Previous evaluations typically study one price change in the program, while the
study based on tax rates provides thousands of diﬀerential price changes, both increases and
decreases, from which I estimate behavioral responses.
3T h e D a t a
I use registry data on individual panels over the period 1974 to 1990 (from 1973 for lagged
income). The data draw information from several sources; demographic information from the
population registry, income information from the tax authorities, and various public beneﬁts
from the social insurance administration. I use a random sample of the 1974 population
who are followed for 17 years.22 About 3 percent of the population is sampled. In addition,
household members of sample individuals are included in the data. This allows us to control
for the household composition as well as spousal income. I deﬁne four education groups; at
least 3 years of college, less than 3 years of college, completed high school, and not completed
high school.23
Individuals are included in the analysis from ages 22 to 60. The age restrictions are due
to the looser connection to the labor market of individuals at the tails of the life cycle. The
young may still be studying and may not have a ﬁrm foot in the labor market. At ages close
to retirement individuals face a number of incentives to leave the labor force that I don’t
model here, and I choose to exclude those observations. I restrict the analysis to individuals
who are labor force participants, which is deﬁned as having positive labor earnings in that
22The only sampled individuals that disappear from the data are those who die or emigrate. For further
details on sample selection and data coverage see Edin and Fredriksson (2000).
23The highest education level is observed in 1990 and this value is used for the whole time period.
8year. Since the sick leave program is designed to replace lost labor earnings this should be the
relevant sample. The baseline regression has just short of 2 million observations, which breaks
down to about 162,000 individuals who are in the sample on average 12 years. Summary
statistics are presented in Table 1.
3.1 Days of Sick Leave
The data contain direct information on annual sick leave beneﬁts which I transform into
days of sick leave. There are two reasons for this transformation. First, economic models
usually stipulate that agents choose days of sick leave so examining this measure is more
in accordance with these theories. Second, examining days of sick leave makes it easier to
interpret the estimated coeﬃcients. The results are robust to using the sick leave beneﬁts
directly rather than their transformation to days of sick leave.
Sick leave beneﬁts for each individual are linear in the number of days claimed. Daily
beneﬁts are 90% of normal earnings up to a cap above which it is a ﬂat amount per day.
For individuals below the cap, days of sick leave are sick leave beneﬁts divided by normal
daily earnings qualifying for sick leave beneﬁts. Normal earnings are what you would have
earned if you had worked.24 I measure normal earnings based on a ﬁxed eﬀects regression.
Real earned income is regressed on demographic interactions, a business cycle control, and an
individual ﬁxed eﬀect for labor force participants over the sample period 1974-1990.25 The
ﬁtted values of this regression including the individual ﬁxed eﬀe c ta r et h en o r m a le a r n i n g s
for each individual. Normal annual earnings are divided by 365 to get daily earnings. For
24According to the rules normal earnings may or may not correspond to actual earnings but are based on
historical earnings.
25The demographic variables are full interactions of gender and education with age and age squared. The
business cycle control is average regional employment rates.
9individuals above the replacement rate cap the procedure is simpler; the daily replacement
beneﬁt is the level of the annual cap divided by 365. Days of sick leave are then observed
sick leave beneﬁts divided by the maximum daily sick leave beneﬁt.
About 63% of the labor force participants claim some sick leave during the year. Figure
1 plots the distribution of annual sick leave for those who claim some sick leave.26 Most
individuals use the sick leave program at some point. For example, among the generation
who turned 25 years of age in 1974 only 1.6% never used the program over the period studied.
Many use the program every year. Indeed, using sick leave every year is the mode of the
distribution for the aforementioned generation. The vast majority of Swedes use the program
multiple times, although there are diﬀerences across generations.27
3.2 Taxes
I n c o m et a x e si nS w e d e na r el e v i e da tt h en a t ional and municipal (kommun) levels. Mu-
nicipal income tax rates are proportional to income and are set by each of the about 280
municipalities. There is a fair amount of variation in the cross-section of these taxes (the
standard deviation in 1990 is 1.2 percentage points). Municipalities raise revenue through
the income tax and service fees.28 The proceeds are used to fund local public services like
roads, sanitation, schools, and day care.
National income taxes are progressive. The tax base for the national tax and the municipal
taxes are virtually identical. In 1983 a new tax base was introduced, called the additional
26The graph is censored at 180 days above which there are very few observations. There is a smaller mass
point at 365 days.
27The diﬀerences in take up rates across generations are studied in Ljunge (2011). Systematic diﬀerences
across generations are captured by the individual ﬁxed eﬀects in the empirical analysis below.
28Property taxes as well as the value added tax are levied by the national government.
10amount. The additional amount is a separate tax base where some deductions, such as
capital losses are cancelled. The tax base is similar to the alternative minimum tax in the
U.S., although the tax is additional rather than alternative.
Sweden has a single ﬁler system, which makes it straightforward to compute marginal tax
rates also for married couples. I observe taxable income as recorded by the tax authorities
and I know the tax schedules for each year. Given this information I can compute marginal
income taxes for each individual in the sample.
Average marginal tax rates for each year arep l o t t e di nF i g u r e2 . M a r g i n a li n c o m et a x e s
exhibit substantial variation over time and at diﬀerent points of the income distribution,
which is illustrated by the marginal tax rate schedules in Figure 3. There are both increases
and decreases in tax rates across the whole income distribution, which is helpful in identifying
the price response.29 T h et a xs c h e d u l e si nF i g u r e3a r eb a s e do nap e r s o nl i v i n gi nS t o c k h o l m .
For individuals in diﬀerent locations the schedules have the same shape but if the municipal
tax rate is higher their tax schedule would be shifted up correspondingly.30
I only use tax rate variation within individual and across time. I ﬁn dt h a tv a r i a t i o ni nt h e
progressive national part of the income tax is the most important factor. There is variation
from changes in the local income tax rates, but this is much less important.31 The price
variation I use has wide support, marginal tax rates vary between 25 and 90 percent.
29In comparison, program evaluations frequently look at one increase or one decrease in prices.
30Average taxable income is 134,000 SEK. It may also be noted that for 1983-1990 there is an additional
source of tax variation introduced by the division of the tax base into the basic and additional amounts. In
plotting the 1986 line it is assumed that the basic and additional amounts are equal. However, given the
same basic amount taxable income some individuals face higher marginal tax rates if their additional amount
exceeds their basic amount taxable income (for example due to capital losses). The tax rate schedule could
be thought of as a correspondence rather than a step function.
31In the benchmark estimates both national and local tax variation is used. Results are also presented
where only variation from the national rate is used. The results from using only the national tax variation
are very similar to the benchmark.
11One beneﬁt of using tax rates to obtain the price elasticity is that there is a lot of variation
in taxes. There are thousands of diﬀerential treatments across time and space from which I
can obtain the price response.32 In contrast, the program participation literature has focused
on evaluating changes in replacement rates within the program, frequently a change at one
p o i n ti nt i m ew i t ho n et r e a t e dg r o u pa n do n ec o n t r o lg r o u p .
4E c o n o m i c M o d e l
This section presents a simple economic model for sick leave through which the estimates
can be interpreted. Consider an economy where agents have utility over consumption  and
sick leave ,
 () (1)
with utility increasing and concave in both arguments, that is, individuals enjoy both con-
sumption and leisure from sick leave but at a diminishing rate. Decisions, which are made
under certainty, are subject to the budget constraint
 = 
¡ ¯  − 
¢
+  +  (2)
The net of tax wage rate is ,  is the sick leave replacement rate, and  is non-labor income.
¯  is a given labor contract that stipulates the number of work days. The choice of sick leave
is a marginal decision while labor contracts are much less ﬂexible.  is required to be no
greater than ¯ .T h e ﬁrst order conditions for this problem are
 = 
 ≤ (1 − )    ¯  (3)
32More than 7,500 diﬀerent marginal tax rates are observed in the sample.
12The multiplier on the budget constraint is , and subscripts denote partial derivatives. I
assume that consumption and sick leave are additively separable in the utility function and









where both 0 and  are parameters. The parameter  determines how responsive marginal
utility is to additional sick leave and  shifts the curve. Some individuals have  -parameters
such that they will choose no sick leave, and others may ﬁnd it optimal to choose  = ¯ .I
substitute the parametric utility function into the ﬁrst order condition at interior points and





( + )=l o g ( 1 − )+l o g +l o g( 1− )+l o g ⇔
 = −[log(1 − )+l o g +l o g( 1− )+l o g] −  (5)
The marginal eﬀect of the log net of tax rate on sick leave is 
log(1−) = −0.I t
is straightforward to allow the utility to depend on individual characteristics. The shifter
 could be parameterized to consist of individual characteristics , an individual speciﬁc
component  a n da ni d i o s y n c r a t i cs h o c k such that  =  +  + . In the empirical
analysis I allow  to depend on a number of individual and aggregate characteristics.
The model builds on the labor supply tradition. It is straightforward to think of  as days
absent from work.  may also be considered as a measure of eﬀort, where eﬀort produces
disutility that is traded oﬀ against consumption.33
33Note that there is no precautionary motive to save sick days since there is no limit to the number of days
one can claim, in contrast the system in for example the U.S..
13The model is focused on sick leave choices since it is the behavioral margin for which there
is good data. Several factors are taken as given, at least in part due to data limitation.34
The basic model presented here is static, although I can allow for savings when the model
is estimated in ﬁrst diﬀerences.35 I ti sa l s op o s s i b l et h a tt h e r ea r ed y n a m i cr e w a r d st ol o w
sick leave, so the net of replacement rate may not capture the full cost of being absent.36
Systematic diﬀerences in these eﬀects across individuals are captured by ﬁxed eﬀects.
One obvious alternative to the story that taxes inﬂuence sick leave behavior is omitted
health shocks. It turns out health shocks work opposite to the hypothesis that the log net of
tax rate has a negative inﬂuence on sick leave. Consider a health shock, which would increase
sick leave and in turn reduce income. As the tax rate is progressive the lower income would
reduce the tax rate and increase the net of tax rate. The health shock produces a positive
relationship between sick leave and after tax wages. This goes against the mechanism I
hypothesize. Indeed, health shocks produce a positive bias. To the extent that health shocks
are quantitatively important, the point estimate of the price response is hence conservative.
5E m p i r i c a l M o d e l
Based on the theoretical model, consider an empirical model where days of sick leave for
individual  at time , denoted by , are chosen according to the following model
 =  log(1 − )+ +  +  +  (6)
34For example, there is no good data on the type of labor contracts individuals have during this time
period.
35The ﬁxed eﬀe c ti ne a c ht i m ed i ﬀerence would account for the marginal utility of wealth.
36To the extent these eﬀects are correlated with current taxes, the estimate of the elasticity picks up the
combined eﬀect. It is beyond the scope of this paper to disentangle the eﬀect of current incentives from
future incentives. I study these dynamic eﬀects in a related paper.
14where  is the marginal tax rate,  is the virtual income that captures income eﬀects of tax
changes,  are individual characteristics,  is an individual eﬀect, and  is an unobserved
i.i.d. shock.37 The individual eﬀect is assumed to be ﬁx e di nt h em a i ns p e c i ﬁcation. The
choices of sick leave days per year are censored at 0 and 365. In the baseline regressions I
use a linear ﬁxed eﬀects estimator with dummies at the two censoring points.
The approach eﬀectively includes only individuals on the intensive margin of sick leave in
a given year. It is exactly this margin where the debate on the elasticity of freely adjustable
labor supply is alive. The taxi driver papers look at workers who have handed in report cards,
that is, they are on the intensive margin.38 The decision to enter the pool of taxi drivers is not
studied. Similarly, Fehr and Goette (2007) study only bike messengers that are active (their
intensive margin decisions) and not the population of potential bike messengers. This is the
primary reason for the speciﬁcation I’ve chosen.39 Another reason is more practical. I have
estimated the model using a Tobit with both lower and upper censoring points. The results
are qualitatively similar, but elasticity estimates are much larger in magnitude. However, it
does not seem that accounting for the censoring points is very important quantitatively.40
The assumption of randomly distributed individual eﬀects in these models, as well as the
assumption of normally distributed error terms in the Tobit, may be hard to maintain. The
linear model with individual ﬁxed eﬀects and dummies at the censoring points relax both
these assumptions.
37Earlier work includes Allen (1981).
38See for example Crawford and Meng (2011).
39The sick leave participation decision is studied, from a diﬀerent perspective, in Ljunge (2011).
40I estimate a linear random eﬀects model with dummies at the censoring points. The estimated elasticity
is slightly lower than the Tobit estimate, which indicates that accounting for the censoring points is not that
important quantitatively. The linear random eﬀects estimate is still much larger than the ﬁxed eﬀects esti-
mate. It indicates that it is very important to relax the random eﬀects assumption and allow for unobserved
heterogeneity through the individual ﬁxed eﬀects.
15The relevant price facing the individual is the net of tax rate. The net of tax rate is what
an individual takes home on the margin. Furthermore, the individual controls include an
indicator of income above the replacement cap as these individuals face lower replacement
rates than the stipulated rate.41
The individual’s budget set is linearized using virtual income.42 Under the assumption
that the tax rate was ﬁxed at the same rate as the marginal tax rate he faces, the virtual
income captures the net income an individual would have if he had zero taxable income.43
The estimate of the coeﬃcient  is used to compute the income elasticity of sick leave with
respect to tax changes.
The compensated elasticity of sick leave with respect to the net of marginal tax rate is
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where  is the elasticity of sick leave with respect to virtual income.44 It is the com-
pensated elasticity that is important from a theoretical perspective to be able to assess the
welfare cost of taxation.
To assess the importance of the functional form in (6) I estimate models where the de-
pendent variable is the logarithm of sick leave. I also estimate the model by using the ﬁrst
diﬀerence estimator rather than the within estimator. When I don’t control for virtual in-
41Individuals do of course get sick for many reasons that are unrelated to tax policy, and hence won’t aﬀect
the estimate. The objective is not to explain the variation in sick leave, only to estimate the inﬂuence of tax
rates.
42The method is frequently used in labor economics, see for example Blundell and MaCurdy (1999).
43The virtual income is computed as individual earnings, including capital income, minus income taxes
paid minus the net of marginal tax rate times taxable income. In addition, spousal income is added when
relevant.
44In terms of the empirical model, 
 = + .
16come, the ﬁrst diﬀerence estimator corresponds to an intertemporal model of labor supply
where tax schedules are anticipated one period in advance similar to MaCurdy (1981). The
assumption that tax schedules are anticipated one period in advance is reasonable given the
legislative lags.
5.1 Marginal Tax Rates
The marginal tax rate is a function of earnings. Since sick leave aﬀe c t se a r n i n g st h e r ei sa
potential endogeneity bias in that tax rates are a function of sick leave, in particular if sick
l e a v es p e l l sa r el o n go rf r e q u e n t . I fId e n o t et h em a r g i n a lt a xr a t ef u n c t i o nb y (),t h e n












depend on sick leave choices. Observed sick leave beneﬁts, and
the compensations rules, are used to the compute taxable income one would have if no sick
leave were claimed. By adding (1 − )to observed taxable income I compute the taxable
income at zero days of sick leave,  ¯ . The tax code is applied to this adjusted taxable




.45 This is the
relevant tax rate facing an individual before he decides whether to call in sick or not. This
tax rate does not depend on sick leave choices. The marginal tax rate at zero days of sick
l e a v ei sw h a ti su s e di nt h ea n a l y s i s .
Virtual income is adjusted in a similar manner to capture the value at zero days of sick
leave. This includes adjusting income to what it would have been if no sick leave had been
claimed and increasing the tax bill based on the extra income (taxed at the marginal tax rate
45For most individuals this means adding one ninth of sick leave beneﬁts to taxable income. The approach
is somewhat diﬀerent in practice due to the replacement cap. The procedure assumes that these additional
earnings would not have been subject to any additional deductions.
17at zero days of sick leave). The adjustments make virtual income independent of current sick
leave choices.
R e l a t i n gs i c kl e a v et ot h et a xr a t ea tz e r od a y so fs i c kl e a v ea v o i d st h ei d e n t i ﬁcation
challenge in the taxable income literature, where the tax rate is a direct function of taxable
income, the dependent variable. Here, in contrast, there is no such direct relationship. The
tax rate is computed on income that is not a function of sick leave. There are of course
remaining concerns of omitted variables and endogeneities, as in all empirical work, and
these concerns are dealt with in the analysis below.
6R e s u l t s
Tax rates have a substantial eﬀect on sick leave. The point estimate has the expected
negative sign and it is highly signiﬁcant. Income eﬀects are negligible, and the compensated
price elasticities are substantial. The results are robust to controlling for a host of factors
and using diﬀerent estimators.
The basic empirical speciﬁcation is a linear individual ﬁxed eﬀect estimator with dummies
at the censoring points, that is, dummies for 0 and 365 days of sick leave. Only variation from
the interior days of sick leave is used to estimate the price elasticities. The main variable of
interest is the log of the net of marginal tax rate. Virtual income is controlled for to account
for income eﬀects due to tax changes. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation in Table 2 includes no other
controls. The estimated coeﬃcient on the net of tax rate has the expected sign; a higher
after tax cost of reporting sick is associated with fewer days of sick leave. The estimate is
identiﬁed using variation within individuals, that is, people take less sick leave during years
18when their net of tax rate is higher than their average level. The magnitude of the eﬀect
is that a 10% increase in the net of marginal tax rate, for example from 50% to 55%, leads
to a one day reduction in sick days on average. To transform the estimate to an elasticity
it is evaluated at the average number of sick days claimed, which produces a compensated
elasticity of sick days to the net of marginal tax rate of -0.38.
As sick leave may be inﬂuenced by demographic and other factors, which may be cor-
related with marginal tax rates, a number of controls are introduced into the model. The
second speciﬁcation includes a full set of interactions of age and age squared with gender
and the four education categories. Including these variables increase the price responsiveness
slightly, as seen in column 2. Including detailed controls for household composition46 increase
the price eﬀects a little further, as seen in the third speciﬁcation.
Accounting for own income, in column 4 of Table 2, has little eﬀect on the sick leave
response. I use a lag since current income may be endogenous. I also include an indicator if
the normal income is above the replacement cap. Accounting for regional ﬁxed eﬀects and
regional business cycles do not aﬀect the analysis either.47 Speciﬁcation 5 adds year ﬁxed
eﬀects to account for aggregate shocks like productivity shocks or the uniform eﬀect of tax
reforms. Another concern could be that the marginal tax rate is a non-linear transformation
of income. It may be that the tax price estimate just picks up non-linear eﬀects across the
income scale. To address this issue I make a 5 piece spline of the lagged earnings, with knots
at quintiles.48 Including these controls produce a substantially higher net of tax estimate of
- 1 8a ss e e ni ns p e c i ﬁcation 5.49
46T h en u m b e ro fc h i l d r e no fd i ﬀerent ages are included as well as marital status.
47Regional employment rates capture the business cycle.
48The results are robust to using a 10 piece spline.
49Most of the increase in the estimate follows adding the non-linear income control. Adding the year ﬁxed
19The compensated sick leave elasticity now stands at -0.72. Although large relative to
traditional labor supply elasticities, it is in the same range as other estimates on workers
that are free to adjust. The bike messengers in Fehr and Goette (2007) have a labor supply
elasticity between 1.34 and 1.5, while Oettinger (1999) estimates elasticities in the range 0.55
to 0.65 for the stadium vendors.
Alternatively, the estimate can also be transformed into an elasticity of days worked.50
The compensated elasticity of days of work is then about 0.10. The days of work elasticity
is in the upper range of compensated labor supply elasticities.51 Hence, the estimate here
based on only one margin of adjustment can account for all of the labor supply elasticity on
the intensive margin in the traditional literature although the workers in that literature are
allowed to adjust on all margins.
The analysis based on days of sick leave is preferred for several reasons. First, sick leave is
the margin along which employees are free to adjust. I would argue it best matches the related
literature on freely adjustable labor supply. The literature has focused on the margin along
which the taxi drivers, stadium vendors, and bike messengers are free to adjust and excluded
other dimensions of labor supply such as all the jobs they hold. I follow this approach. The
second reason is that sick leave is accurately measured in the data. There are not good
measures in the data from this period of how many days each individual work and how many
days they don’t work for reasons other than sick leave.
The analysis thus far shows that the price responsiveness of sick leave does not rely on
year to year tax reforms or diﬀerences in behavior across diﬀe r e n ti n c o m eg r o u p s . W h a tI
eﬀects has a small eﬀect.
50Here it is necessary to make an assumption on how many days the average employee works.
51See for example Blundell and MaCurdy (1999).
20exploit is the long time period where tax rates change diﬀerentially at diﬀerent sections of
the income distribution. Individuals tend to have higher sick leave during years when they
face higher tax rates than they usually face. Since the within estimator is applied the eﬀect
is identiﬁed from deviations from individual means.
Estimated income eﬀects are economically insigniﬁcant throughout, although they are
statistically signiﬁcant. The point estimate on virtual income is negative. From a labor
supply perspective that indicates that sick leave is an inferior good, and not quite comparable
to leisure. From the perspective of subjective well-being, a negative income eﬀect is to be
expected.52 Higher income may also be associated with more interesting job tasks, and thus
a higher cost for being absent.
I believe the estimates have a causal interpretation. Tax policy is exogenous to the
individual. It’s reasonable to assume that tax reforms are enacted independent of local health
trends. The tax changes exploited provide thousands of diﬀerent incentives for individuals
across time. These price changes have a signiﬁcant impact on individual behavior. The
exogeneity of the price changes are explored further below.
6.1 Alternative Speciﬁcations
The analysis in Table 2 is based on days of sick leave, which is a transformation of the amount
of sick leave beneﬁts observed in the data. How does the transformation of beneﬁts into sick
leave days aﬀect the analysis? I run speciﬁcation 5 in Table 2 with sick leave beneﬁts as the
dependent variable. When evaluating the elasticity at the sample mean I ﬁnd an elasticity
52Income is the second strongest correlate with subjective well-being, after health, according to Graham
(2009).
21of -0.77 as seen in the ﬁr s tc o l u m ni nT a b l e3 . 53 The elasticity is slightly higher than when
using the transformed variable, indicating attenuation bias from the imprecise measure of
days.
The results are robust to several further alternative speciﬁcations. Caring for young
children doesn’t aﬀect the estimate. Women with children between the ages 0 and 2 are
excluded from the sample (only women since care of young children were mostly done by
women during the period of study). Excluding this group does not aﬀect the results, as seen
in the second column of Table 3. Another concern may be the measurement of sick leave
beneﬁts. Up until 1983 maternity leave was included in sick leave beneﬁts but starting in 1984
the parental leave in connection to the birth of a child was reported separately. In addition,
care for sick child was reported separately from 1987. These deﬁnitional changes could aﬀect
the analysis. To examine the impact the sick leave variable is redeﬁned as take up of any
of the three programs (sick leave, parental leave, and care for sick child). Redeﬁning the
dependent variable does not aﬀect the estimated coeﬃcients much, as seen in speciﬁcation 3.
There could be a bias from the fact that the data may not include the ﬁrst uncompensated
day of the spell, but I argue that such omissions would bias the estimate toward zero.54 There
is only a concern about the omission of the ﬁrst day for spells that are correlated with tax
rates. Such ’discretionary’ sick leave could hence be underreported in the data. However,
such underreports would make the estimated price response smaller than the true response
since the price variation is related to the observed sick leave variation, which would be smaller
than the true variation. The bias would hence be toward zero.
53The point estimate on virtual income is larger than before, but since it relates to the monetary amount
of beneﬁts its inﬂuence on the elasticity is negligible.
54As argued above, the uncompensated day would be irrelevant for an individual who anticipates being on
sick leave tomorrow if you report sick today.
22The estimate is not inﬂuenced by individual shifting across programs.55 Individuals are
excluded who have taken up either unemployment beneﬁts or welfare payments during the
year. The responsiveness to the net of tax rate is similar to the baseline speciﬁcation.
The composition of the labor force doesn’t aﬀect the results. It could be that unhealthy
workers drop out of the labor force, which could aﬀect the estimates if this tends to happen
when they face relatively low (or high) tax rates. The fourth speciﬁcation includes only
individuals aged 22-50, an age range with very little exit from the labor force. Estimates are
somewhat lower in this group but still sizable and strongly signiﬁcant.
The results are not driven by individuals with very high or low incomes. Speciﬁcation
6 only includes individuals whose virtual income is at least 30,000 and less than 3,000,000
SEK.56 The estimated elasticity is similar to the baseline speciﬁcation. It may be noted that
t h ei n c o m ee ﬀect is an order of magnitude larger in this speciﬁcation, but still income eﬀects
are not economically signiﬁcant, and the compensated elasticity remains large.
The results are similar if the sample is split into shorter periods. As the study covers 17
years there could be a worry that some underlying factors have changed over the time period,
which may aﬀect the estimate. The sample period has been split in half, from 1974 to 1981
and from 1982 to 1990. Both periods experience both tax increases and decreases, and they
produce similar results. Other time period splits produce similar results, such as excluding
the last three years when the sick leave rules were slightly diﬀerent from the ﬁrst 14 years.
The estimates are not driven by the full 17 year period, but the results are also present for
shorter periods.
55For example, Larsson (2006) ﬁnds shifting between the unemployment and sick leave beneﬁts.
56Average virtual income is 120,000 SEK.
23It could also be that there is some skill bias in sick leave, which is correlated with tax
changes.57 To address the concern of non-linear trends by skill group, year ﬁxed eﬀects in-
teracted with the four education groups are included in speciﬁcation 7. The estimates are
virtually identical after adding these controls. Skill bias is not driving of the results.
Omitted income shocks, over and above the income controls, would be a concern if they
reduced the net of tax rate (by increasing the tax rate) and increased sick leave. First note
that the estimate of the income eﬀect, the virtual income term, is negative so a positive
income shock would be expected to reduce sick leave, in contrast to the concern of sick leave
increasing with income. Yet, omitted income shocks may be accounted for by including
taxable income, the income the tax schedule is applied to, as a control.58 The estimated
elasticity is still large and signiﬁcant, although slightly smaller in magnitude compared to
the baseline, as seen in the last column of Table 3. Omitted variables, which aﬀect taxable
income and sick leave can hence not explain the result. This is a powerful result as it accounts
for any omitted income shocks driving both taxable income (and hence tax rates) and sick
leave.
6.2 Logarithmic Models in Diﬀerences
Based on the distribution of sick leave in Figure 1 it may be interesting to examine a model
where sick leave is distributed lognormally. The basic model (6) is reformulated so that the
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of days of sick leave. The following speciﬁcations
only include basic demographic controls, age and age squared interacted with gender and
57Although it seems unlikely, a priori, that the skill bias would follow the non-linear pattern of tax rates.
58The taxable income has been adjusted to reﬂect income at zero days of sick leave, as before, in order to
remove any direct relationship with the dependent variable.
24education, and year ﬁxed eﬀects. The purpose of these more limited controls is to further
examine the exogeneity of the tax rate variation, by excluding any potentially endogenous
controls that could bias the price response estimate.
The logarithmic speciﬁcation is ﬁrst estimated in levels using the individual ﬁxed eﬀects
estimator. The estimated coeﬃcient, -0.49 in column 1 of Table 4, should be interpreted
as the uncompensated price elasticity of sick leave. Not including the income eﬀects would
have a minor eﬀect on the estimated elasticity as the income eﬀects estimated above are very
small. The estimated elasticity is a bit larger than speciﬁcation 2 in Table 2, which may be
the closest comparison, but smaller than the baseline estimate in column 5 of Table 2.
The model is estimated in ﬁrst diﬀerences in column 2 of Table 4.59 This estimator
diﬀerences out an individual speciﬁce ﬀect in each time diﬀerence, and may be a more ﬂexible
method to account for unobserved heterogeneity compared to the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator. The
estimated elasticity of -0.68 is larger than the ﬁxed eﬀects estimate in the previous column
and similar in magnitude to the baseline elasticity in column 5 of Table 2. The result indicates
that the ﬁrst diﬀerence estimator removes some bias toward zero imposed by the assumption
of the within estimator that the ﬁxed eﬀect is constant across time.60
The individual tax rate is composed of a local tax rate and a national tax rate. The
tax rate may hence depend on where the individual chooses to live, and there may be a
concern that individuals with a high demand for sick leave move to places with higher local
tax rates, which would induce a negative correlation between tax rates and sick leave. To
59The estimated model is ∆log()=∆log(1 − )+∆ + ∆ where ∆ denotes the ﬁrst
diﬀerence operator.
60The dependent variable days of sick leave is as discussed a transformation of sick leave beneﬁts, where
the beneﬁts are linear in the number of days claimed. Using the log of sick leave beneﬁts as the dependent
variable produce very similar result, in the speciﬁcation just discussed the estimate is -0.717, indicating that
the transformation does not drive the results in this speciﬁcation either.
25address concerns that mobility, or any factor correlated with changes in the local tax rate,
would aﬀe c tt h ee s t i m a t eIi n s t r u m e n tf o rt h ei n d i v i d u a l ’ st o t a lt a xr a t ew i t ht h en a t i o n a lt a x
rate, which is independent of location. The ﬁrst stage in this regression is extremely strong,
indicating that almost all the relevant tax rate variation comes from the national rate. The
second stage estimate is very similar to the OLS estimate, as seen in speciﬁcation 3 in Table
4, indicating that mobility does not explain the results.
The national tax rate is progressive across income, as illustrated in Figure 3. It would
hence be a concern if the tax reforms studied induce labor supply responses which aﬀect
income and in turn sick leave. The labor supply responses would have to follow a particular
pattern for this to be a concern. For example, a tax cut could increase labor supply and
income that in turn would reduce sick leave, a negative relationship between sick leave and
the net of tax rate, if sick leave is a normal good. However, the estimate of the income eﬀect
above is negative indicating that sick leave is an inferior good.
There may still be concerns that income responds to tax policy, which in turn inﬂuences
sick leave.61 To address this I construct a tax rate that isn’t based on current income. Current
taxable income is regressed on taxable income lagged ﬁve years, demographic interactions
(age/gender/education interactions), andg r o w t hr a t e sb ye d u c a t i o ng r o u p s( y e a re ﬀects in-
teracted with education groups). The tax code is applied to the predicted taxable income
from that regression and the log net of national tax rate is computed based on the income
prediction, which is diﬀerenced and used as an instrument for the diﬀerence of the log net of
61Most labor supply estimates consider adjustment periods longer than our 1 year window. It may also
be noted that the Swedish labor market hardly was the most ﬂexible during this time period, which made it
harder to adjust labor contracts immediately following a tax reform.
26total tax rate.62 63 The ﬁr s ts t a g ei sn o tw e a k .
The point estimate of -0.64 from using the national tax rate based on projected income
is similar to the previous IV estimate and the OLS estimate, as seen in the fourth column of
Table 4. The estimate is strongly signiﬁcant, although the standard errors are now larger.64
The results are similar if the sixth lag is used instead of the ﬁf t hl a gi nt h ei n c o m ep r oj e c t i o n . 65
I conclude that the estimates are driven by exogenous tax rate variation and not endogenous
income responses induced by the tax reforms.
6.3 Heterogeneity
Table 5 presents the estimated price elasticity of sick leave for diﬀerent demographic and
occupational groups. The ﬁrst diﬀerence model estimated with OLS is used just like speciﬁ-
cation 2 in Table 4. I ﬁnd that women are more elastic than men, and that married women
are more elastic than the unmarried women, as can be seen in the ﬁrst four speciﬁcations in
Table 5, in line with the previous labor supply literature. Furthermore, women with children
are more elastic than those without children.66 These patterns may be explained by women
b e i n gr e l a t i v e l ym o r ep r o d u c t i v ei nt h eh o m es e c t o ra n dh e n c em o r em a r g i n a li nt h em a r k e t
62The projected income is hence used to compute the tax rates used as instruments in both period t and
t - 1i ne a c ht i m ed i ﬀerence. Note also that only variation from the national rate is used.
63This instrumental variables approach is essential in the taxable income literature since the tax rate is
a function of the dependent variable taxable income. In the analysis here, however, there is no such direct
functional relationship since the tax rates, computed at zero days of sick leave, are independent of the realized
number of sick days.
64In this speciﬁcation the tax treatment is based on income 5 years ago, while at the same time diﬀerencing
out the unobserved heterogeneity between periods t and t-1, which separates the treatment from current
individual inﬂuences.
65The argument for not using the ﬁrst lag is that temporary income shocks may correlate with the instru-
ment and subsequent sick leave. By using longer lags such concerns are reduced. That the results using the
ﬁfth and sixth lags are similar also indicate that there is no remaining mean reversion from temporary shocks
at these lag lengths.
66Women with children up to age 6 are more elastic compared to women with children up to age 15, who
in turn are more elastic than women without children (up to age 6) living at home. The elasticities for the
three groups are -1.16, -.98, and -.81, respectively.
27sector compared to men, which may induce a higher price responsiveness to market sector
returns. The same argument applies to married versus unmarried women, as well as women
with and without children. Furthermore, public sector employees are more elastic than the
private sector employees, as seen in speciﬁcations 5 and 6 in Table 5.67 This diﬀerence may
be understood as a response to an environment where public sector workers face less ﬂexible
labor contracts compared to the private sector. Public sector employees have access to sick
leave, and may respond more to incentives on this margin.
Next, I examine a group that I suspect, a priori, to be unresponsive to incentives. Accord-
ing to the rules of the sick leave program there should be no relationship between marginal
tax rates (or other monetary incentives) and use of sick leave beneﬁts. The group who is
most familiar with how to apply the rules is the individuals processing the claims. I estimate
the model on the sample of social insurance administrators. The point estimate is virtually
zero as seen in column 7 of Table 5, and insigniﬁcant.68 Hence, the employees of the social
insurance administration pass the falsiﬁcation test.
Table 6 presents estimates for the same demographic groups as in Table 5 but the de-
pendent variable is sick leave beneﬁts. As discussed above, the measure of days of sick leave
is based on a transformation of the sick leave beneﬁts and there could be a concern that
the procedure would aﬀect the estimates. Table 6 provides further evidence that this is not
the case. Estimates are very similar when using sick leave beneﬁts, though slightly higher in
magnitude.69
67These regressions have fewer observations since the sector information isn’t available for the ﬁrst few
years of the sample.
68This result is not due to the smaller sample size for this group. The baseline estimate is obtained when
drawing random samples of individuals of similar size, and standard errors are similar to those in column 7
of Table 5.
69The estimates in Table 6 are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the estimates based on sick leave days in
287C o n c l u s i o n
To work, or not to work today? The sick leave program in Sweden makes that the relevant
question for Swedish employees. The program provides a unique opportunity to study how
price elastic labor supply is when the employees can decide how much to work, and how often
to call in sick.
I estimate a substantial price elasticity of sick leave, -0.7. The estimates are robust to
using alternative estimation methods. I apply ﬁxed eﬀect and ﬁrst diﬀerence estimators, and
Iu s ed i ﬀerent approaches to account for potential endogeneities and omitted variables. The
results support the interpretation that it’s the exogenous tax rate variation that causes the
behavioral response; individuals claim more sick leave during years when they face relatively
higher tax rates and, hence, lower returns to working on the margin.
T h es a m p l ei sr e p r e s e n t a t i v eo ft h ep o p u l a t i o n ,w h e r eo t h e r sh a v ee x a m i n e dv e r ys e l e c t
occupations. Two decades of tax reforms provide substantial price variation, in comparison
to many studies over short time periods with very limited price variation. Using tax rate vari-
ation, which is relevant from a policy perspective, I ﬁnd that workers along the discretionary
margin of sick leave act as though they are neoclassical and highly elastic.
Sick leave is unique in that the individual can use it at his discretion. Most labor supply
adjustments are associated with adjustment costs or other distortions, which may drive a
wedge between the estimated and the true behavioral elasticities as discussed by Chetty
(2011). In an environment where many margins are subject to adjustment distortions, the
sick leave elasticity captures behavior when workers face few frictions and are free to choose.
Table 5.
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Figure 3. Marginal Tax Rate Schedules
Table 1. Summary statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Days of sick leave 1950473 25.0 57.6
Program participation rate 1950473 0.636 0.481
Marginal tax rate 1950267 0.498 0.130
Age 1950473 39.9 10.7
Man 1950473 0.523 0.499
Married 1950473 0.596 0.491
Earnings, 1990 SEK 1949142 126884 317706.8
< High school 1950473 0.412 0.492
High school 1950473 0.379 0.485
College, up to 2 years 1950473 0.093 0.290
College, 3+ years 1950473 0.116 0.320
Sample: Labor force participants, 22-60 years old, years 1974-1990.
34Table 2. Price Elasticity of Days of Sick Leave.
Dependent Variable: Days of Sick Leave
Individual fixed effect regressions
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(1-t) -9.44 -10.68 -11.24 -11.31 -18.03
(.201) (.206) (.198) (.2) (.237)
Virtual Income -0.00063 -0.00052 -0.00056 -0.00055 -0.00070
(.0002) (.00017) (.00018) (.00018) (.00022)
Dummies for 0 and 365 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
days of sick leave
Age, age sq interacted Yes Yes Yes Yes
with gender and education
Months with Infant x Female Yes Yes Yes
Child 7 months-2 years Yes Yes Yes
Child 3-6, Child 7-15 years Yes Yes Yes
Marital status Yes Yes Yes
Income lag Yes Yes
Income above cap indicator Yes Yes
Business Cycle control Yes Yes
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes
Income lag Spline Yes
Compensated elasticity of  -0.38 -0.43 -0.45 -0.45 -0.72
sick leave with respect to 1-t
Observations 1948956 1948956 1948956 1948956 1948956
Notes: The marginal tax rate is denoted by t. Virtual income measured in 1000's of 1990 SEK.
Months with infant counts the number of months there is a child of up to 7 months of age in the household.
Education is grouped into 3+ years of college, <3 years of college, high school, <high school.
Business Cycle (BC) control is average regional employment rates.
Permanent income is an estimated individual fixed effect of earnings on demographic interactions and 
BC controls. Spline is 5 piece with knots at quintiles. Elasticities evaluated at sample means.
Individual panel data from 1974-1990, annually. Estimates of the within estimator.
Standard errors, clustered by individual, in parenthesis. Sample: Labor force participants, 22-60 years old.
35Table 3. Alternative specifications.
Dependent Variable (columns 2-8): Days of Sick Leave
Individual fixed effect regressions
Alternative explanation: Incorrect Fertility Program Use of  Composition Income Skill biased Omitted
measure definition other of labor restrictions time trends income 
of days programs force shocks
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(1-t) -5978 -16.77 -17.63 -17.31 -14.21 -16.48 -17.88 -14.65
(156.977) (.233) (.243) (.237) (.258) (.269) (.233) (.425)
Virtual Income -0.289 -0.00053 -0.00059 -0.00067 -0.00059 -0.00818 -0.00068 -0.00096
(.09182) (.00019) (.0002) (.00021) (.00023) (.00075) (.00021) (.0003)
Additional controls Sick leave Exclude Broader  Exclude Include only Include only Year effects Taxable
or sample restrictions benefits as women with sick leave people with  ages 22-50 virtual income interacted income at
dependent children 0-2 measure UI benefits,  30-3000 ksek with 0 days of
variable years old welfare. education sick leave
Compensated elasticity with respect to 1-t:
Sick Leave Elasticity -0.77 -0.77 -0.65 -0.73 -0.55 -0.78 -0.72 -0.59
Observations 1954168 1865072 1948956 1835909 1414046 1523762 1948956 1948956
Notes: All controls used in Table 2, column (5), are included if applicable.
Individual panel data from 1974-1990, annually. Estimates of the within estimator.
Standard errors, clustered by individual, in parenthesis. Sample: Labor force participants, 22-60 years old.
Table 4. Logarithmic specifications estimated in first differences. 
Dependent Variable:  log(Sick Leave) log(Sick Leave) log(Sick Leave) log(Sick Leave)
Estimator: Individual  fixed First First First 
effects (levels) differences differences differences
OLS IV IV
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
log(1-t) -0.485
(.009)
log(1-t) -0.683 -0.716 -0.642
(.011) (.011) (.206)
Instrument: National  National tax  
tax rate rate based on 
projected income
Observations 1231509 929929 929929 670968
Notes: Controls included in all specifications are age and age squared fully interacted with gender 
and education, as well as year fixed effects.  is the first time difference operator.
The dependent variable in columns 2-4 is log(Sick Leave).
Individual panel data from 1974-1990, annually. Column 4 includes data from 1979-1990.
Standard errors, clustered by individual, in parenthesis. 
Sample: Labor force participants, 22-60 years old.
36Table 5. Heterogeneity across demographic and occupational groups.
Dependent Variable:  log(Sick Leave)
First differences regressions
Sample Men Women Women,  Women,  Public sector Private sector Social insurance
Married Unmarried employees employees administrators
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log(1-t) -0.54 -0.90 -0.99 -0.80 -0.67 -0.59 0.003
(.014) (.019) (.026) (.027) (.021) (.017) (.246)
Observations 453427 476502 282359 194143 308739 359020 1958
Notes: Controls included in all specifications are age and age squared fully interacted with gender and education,
as well as year fixed effects.  is the first time difference operator.
Individual panel data from 1974-1990, annually. The models are estimated with OLS.
Standard errors, clustered by individual, in parenthesis. Sample: Labor force participants, 22-60 years old.
Table 6. Heterogeneity estimates based on sick leave benefits.
Dependent Variable:  log(Sick Leave Benefits)
First differences regressions
Sample Men Women Women,  Women,  Public sector Private sector Social insurance
Married Unmarried employees employees administrators
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log(1-t) -0.58 -0.93 -1.00 -0.85 -0.69 -0.62 0.043
(.014) (.019) (.026) (.026) (.021) (.016) (.245)
Observations 467472 493572 287395 206177 316705 368736 1962
Notes: Controls included in all specifications are age and age squared fully interacted with gender and education,
as well as year fixed effects.  is the first time difference operator.
Individual panel data from 1974-1990, annually. The models are estimated with OLS.
Standard errors, clustered by individual, in parenthesis. Sample: Labor force participants, 22-60 years old.
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